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Statutory Stare Decisis
in the Courts of Appeals
Amy Coney Barrett*
Introduction
The Supreme Court has long given its cases interpreting statutes special
protection from overruling. The Court is relatively willing to overrule its
constitutional precedents, because in that context, the Court reasons that
"correction through legislative action is practically impossible."' But the Supreme Court insists that a party advocating the abandonment of a statutory
precedent bears a greater burden. In that context, the Court claims that stare
decisis has "special force."' 2 It gains this special force from the principle of
legislative supremacy-the belief that Congress, rather than the Supreme
Court, bears primary responsibility for shaping policy through statutory law.
The Supreme Court's cases and the literature discussing them offer two
explanations for how the Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis practice
honors the supremacy of the legislature. One line of thought interprets Congress's silence following the Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute as
approval of that interpretation. If Congress had disagreed with the Supreme
Court's interpretation, the argument goes, Congress would have amended
the statute to reflect its disagreement. By failing to amend the statute, Congress signals its acquiescence in the Supreme Court's approach. According to
this way of thinking, the Court's practice of giving its statutory precedent
particularly forceful effect reflects its reluctance to abandon statutory interpretations that Congress, through its silence, has effectively approved. Statutory stare decisis, in other words, reflects deference to Congress's wishes.
A second line of thought eschews the notion that congressional silence
following a Supreme Court statutory interpretation reflects acquiescence in
it, but still advocates heightened stare decisis in statutory cases as a means of
honoring legislative supremacy. Those who subscribe to this second school of
thought emphasize that in our Constitution's separation of powers, policymaking is an aspect of legislative, rather than judicial, power. Because statutory interpretation inevitably involves policymaking, it risks infringing upon
legislative power, and consequently, the Supreme Court should approach the
task with caution. The Court cannot avoid interpreting a statute-and the
attendant policymaking-the first time a statutory ambiguity is presented to
it. Thereafter, however, the Supreme Court's refusal to revisit a statutory
interpretation is a means of shifting policymaking responsibility back to Congress, where it belongs. "Were we to alter our statutory interpretations from
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks to Jesse Barrett, Brad

Clark, Bill Kelley, and John Nagle for helpful comments. For excellent research assistance,
thanks to Ed Berk and Adam Greenwood. Errors are mine.
1 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
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case to case," the Supreme Court explains, "Congress would have less reason
to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise
or unfair." 3 In other words, super-strong statutory stare decisis lets Congress
know that changes in statutory interpretations ought to come from it.4 As a
result, the argument goes, Congress (and other interested parties) will be
more likely to use the democratic rather than the judicial process to resolve
the policy questions that lie at the heart of interpretive disputes.
A robust literature exists debating the wisdom of the Supreme Court's
statutory stare decisis doctrine. That robust literature, however, has wholly
overlooked a curious aspect of super-strong statutory stare decisis: the courts
of appeals have adopted it too. Scholars of statutory interpretation have not
noticed the appearance of this doctrine in the lower courts, and the logic of
its presence there is not immediately apparent. It is one thing to claim that
congressional silence signals approval of a decision from the Supreme Court;
it is another thing to claim that congressional silence signals approval of a
decision from any of the courts of appeals. Similarly, it is one thing to assert
that Congress ought to correct the Supreme Court's statutory mistakes; it is
another thing to assert that Congress ought to correct mistakes from each of
the thirteen circuits.
This Article explores whether statutory stare decisis is an example of an
interpretive practice in which the Supreme Court and the lower courts should
diverge. Part I briefly describes the doctrine of statutory stare decisis and the
rationales advanced for that doctrine in the Supreme Court. Part II analyzes
whether a theory of congressional acquiescence supports statutory stare decisis in the circuits, and Part III analyzes whether the doctrine can be justified
by reference to the Constitution's separation-of-powers principle. I conclude
that in the courts of appeals, as in the Supreme Court, the theory emphasizing the connection between statutory stare decisis and the separation of powers provides far more credible support for the doctrine than does a theory of
congressional acquiescence. Nevertheless, even the separation-of-powers
theory does not justify super-strong statutory stare decisis in the courts of
appeals. To the extent that statutory stare decisis operates as a restraint on
judicial policymaking, it does so based on assumptions about how Congress
will react to the Supreme Court. It is both impractical and inconsistent with
the system of appellate review that Congress has designed for the inferior
courts to assume that Congress will respond to them in the same way.
Whatever the merits of statutory stare decisis in the Supreme Court, the inferior courts have no sound basis for following the Supreme Court's practice.
Although my specific focus here appears narrow, the subject in fact has
larger implications. For one thing, statutory stare decisis has become part of
the methodology that the courts of appeals apply in interpreting statutes. Because the courts of appeals resolve more interpretive disputes than does the
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996).
I have borrowed the modifier "super-strong" from William Eskridge. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents] (describing the Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis
practice as the application of a "super-strong presumption of correctness" to statutory
precedents).
3

4
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Supreme Court, ensuring a sound interpretive theory for the courts of appeals is in some respects more important than doing the same for the Supreme Court. Abandoning statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals is a
step in that direction. Even beyond the limited doctrinal impact of this insight, however, the question whether the courts of appeals ought to be applying statutory stare decisis is a question worth asking. This Article's
conclusion illuminates the neglect that scholars and courts have shown toward the structural differences between the Supreme Court and the inferior

courts in questions of interpretation, and it underscores the importance and
potential fruitfulness of focusing attention on those differences.
L
A.

Statutory Stare Decisis in the Supreme Court

The Doctrine

The Supreme Court has accorded heightened deference to its statutory
precedent for roughly a century.5 The classic illustration of this heightened
deference is the line of Supreme Court cases addressing the question whether
the Sherman Act, which renders illegal "every contract .. .in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States," 6 applies to organized baseball.
In 1922, the Supreme Court held in FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore, Inc.
v. National League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs that it did not because the
Court considered baseball to be a purely intrastate affair. 7 Over the next

thirty years, both the business of baseball and the Court's understanding of
"interstate commerce" so expanded that the Court almost surely would have
applied the Sherman Act to organized baseball if it had considered the question as an original matter. 8 Nonetheless, in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., decided in 1953, the Court reaffirmed baseball's exemption from federal
antitrust law on the ground that the precedent exempting it was statutory. 9

The Court insisted that any change in statutory precedent ought to come
from Congress, and Congress, though aware of Federal Baseball, had left it

undisturbed. 10

5 Thomas Lee, Stare Decisis in HistoricalPerspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 731 (1999) (asserting that the Supreme Court's heightened
deference toward statutory precedent first surfaced in the late nineteenth century and "crystallized in a series of opinions in the Hughes Court"). William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett have observed that state courts are even more emphatic in their belief that
statutory precedent should be overruled only rarely. WILLIAM ESKRIDOGE ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 612 (3d ed. 2001).

6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
7 Fed. Baseball Club of Bait., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208-09 (1922).
8 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357-60 (1953) (Burton, J., dissenting)
(describing ways in which organized baseball had increasingly affected interstate commerce
through, inter alia, interstate travel, interstate advertising, and interstate purchases); see also
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that when FederalBaseball was decided, the Court had a "narrow, parochial view of commerce" that had been undermined by subsequent decisions giving "interstate commerce" an expansive interpretation for
purposes of the Commerce Clause).
9 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
10 Id.
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The Court confronted the baseball exemption again in Flood v. Kuhn, 1
and by this time, baseball's exemption had become a downright anomaly.
Flood reached the Supreme Court in 1972. By then, the Court had interpreted the Sherman Act to apply to boxing, football, and basketball. 12 Baseball appeared to be the only organized sport beyond the Sherman Act's
reach. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court again affirmed its original interpretation, again on the ground of statutory stare decisis. 13 Had FederalBaseball
and Toolson been constitutional or common law cases, the change in case law
and circumstances would have justified overruling them. 14 But these cases
interpreted a statute. While acknowledging that the baseball exemption was
illogical and inconsistent with other case law, the Court asserted that statutory precedent deserves particularly strong stare decisis effect, and it left the
15
baseball exemption in place.
While Toolson and Flood may represent an anomaly in federal antitrust
law, they do not represent an anomaly in statutory interpretation. Instead,
these cases illustrate a principle well ingrained in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence: Cases interpreting statutes are rarely overruled. As the Court
often explains, "Considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of
statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation.' 6 Because statutory precedents are nearly sacrosanct, "the burden borne by the party advocating abandonment of a
precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory
construction" than when the Court is asked to overrule another point of
law. 17 Indeed, the force of the Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis doc11 Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
12 Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (Douglas, J.) (asserting
that basketball enjoys no exemption from the antitrust laws); Radovich v. Nat'l Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1957) (holding that antitrust laws apply to football); United States v. Int'l
Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1955) (holding that antitrust laws apply to boxing).
13 Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84. While the Supreme Court has not retreated from its position
that statutory precedent deserves super-strong effect, it has begun to relax that presumption in
cases arising under the Sherman Act. Recently, the Court has begun to reason that since the
Sherman Act authorizes the creation of federal common law, cases interpreting the Sherman Act
ought be treated like common law cases, rather than statutory cases, for purposes of stare decisis
effect. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997); see also Eskridge, Overruling
Statutory Precedents,supra note 4, at 1376-81 (describing the Court's practice with respect to
"common law" statutes like the Sherman Act). For a discussion of how the Supreme Court
treats its common law precedent, see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
14 Both changed circumstances and developments in the law are established grounds for
overruling constitutional and common law precedents, assuming that reliance interests do not
cut strongly the other way. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
855 (1992) (considering both the workability of prior constitutional interpretation and "whether
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification"); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,403
(1975) (overruling common law precedent because "subsequent history and experience have
conspicuously eroded the rule's foundations").
15 Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84. Some change in this area recently has come from Congress.
The Curt Flood Act of 1998 subjects organized baseball to the antitrust laws, at least with respect
to matters relating to the employment of major league baseball players. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2000).
16 Il. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
17 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
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trine is so strong that it prevails over other interpretive principles, including
otherwise weighty interpretive principles like "clear statement" rules. 18 The
Supreme Court repeatedly asserts that statutory cases are special and call for
special application of stare decisis.1 9
This special treatment of statutory precedent fits into a system in which
the Supreme Court varies the strength of the precedent according to the
source of law that the precedent interprets. Cases interpreting statutes, as we
have been discussing, receive stronger-than-normal stare decisis effect. Cases
interpreting the Constitution, by contrast, receive weaker-than-normal stare
decisis effect. The Supreme Court frequently explains that it will more readily overrule a constitutional decision than any other kind of decision, because
when it erroneously interprets the Constitution, "correction through legislative action is practically impossible. ' 20 The baseline of normal stare decisis
21
effect is apparently reserved for cases developing the federal common law.
This variety of approaches means that stare decisis effectively comes in three
different strengths in the Supreme Court: "statutory strong," "common law
normal," and "constitutional weak. ' 22 The next part describes the rationales
that have been advanced to justify the Supreme Court's application of a
super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedent.

18 Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1991) ("In the case before us
the clear statement inquiry need not be made and we need not decide whether FELA satisfies
that standard, for the rule in any event does not prevail over the doctrine of stare decisis as
applied to a longstanding statutory construction implicating important reliance interests."); see
also id. at 209-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (protesting that the clear statement rule is more
important than statutory stare decisis). The clear statement rule at issue in Hilton was the rule
that the Court will not construe a federal statute to abrogate a State's sovereign immunity unless
Congress makes clear its intention to do so.
19 Of course, as with any interpretive principle, the Court is susceptible to being criticized
for applying it inconsistently. See, e.g., Eskridge, OverrulingStatutory Precedents,supra note 4,
at 1427-39 (listing twenty-six Supreme Court decisions explicitly overruling statutory precedents
between 1961 and 1987, another twenty-four implicitly overruling statutory precedents, and another thirty-five significantly curtailing statutory precedents or overruling their reasoning).
Even assuming that these are examples of occasional unfaithfulness rather than legitimate overruling, statutory stare decisis remains an important force in the Court's jurisprudence, as Eskridge himself recognizes. Id. at 1368; see also Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The
Casefor an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MicH. L. REV. 177, 182-83 (1989) (noting the continuing force of the principle despite the Court's occasional unfaithfulness to it).
20 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). John Manning argues that the Court's different treatment of statutory and constitutional
cases for purposes of stare decisis is part of an "important intellectual tradition" in which the
Court calls for greater flexibility in interpreting the Constitution than in interpreting statutes.
John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113
YALE L.J. 1663, 1692-93, 1697-99 & n.138 (2004).
21 Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 4, at 1366; see, e.g., Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403-05 (1970) (discussing four factors underlying the
value of stare decisis in the common law context).
22 Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 4, at 1362, 1364-66 (describing
the Court's three-tiered approach to stare decisis, which accords super-strong effect to statutory
precedents, normal effect to common law precedents, and weak effect to constitutional
precedents).
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Rationales for Statutory Stare Decisis
1.

CongressionalAcquiescence

The Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis opinions reveal two rationales, both rooted in legislative supremacy, for giving statutory precedent
particularly strong effect. The rationale that has been discussed most widely
in both the cases and commentary is the one I will call "congressional acquiescence"-the belief that congressional inaction following the Supreme
23
Court's interpretation of a statute reflects congressional acquiescence in it.
While this rationale is misguided, as I will explain in Part II, it is fairly easy to
describe. It proceeds from the premise that the Supreme Court ought to
function as Congress's faithful agent in interpreting statutes, and it treats
Congress's silence following a Supreme Court opinion as indicating what
Congress, as principal, desires. 24 Guido Calabresi has explained the logic of
the acquiescence rationale this way: "When a court says to a legislature, 'You
(or your predecessor) meant X,' it almost invites the legislature to answer:
'We did not." 25 If Congress does not correct the Court's interpretation by
amending the statute, the Court should assume that Congress approves of its

23 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998); Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763-64 (1998); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1992);
Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202; United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 686, 687 n.6 (1987); Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau,
Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 421-22, 424 (1986); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48, 55 n.18 (1985); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281-84 (1972); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 71-78 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative
Inaction]; Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents,supra note 4, at 1402-08; Daniel A. Farber,
Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2, 8-14 (1988);
John Grabow, CongressionalSilence and the Searchfor Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 741-54 (1985); Marshall, supra note 19, at 184-96; Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and
Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
24 See, e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84 ("Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed
those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively."); see also Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 23, at 93-95 (recognizing that in the congressional acquiescence cases,
the Supreme Court takes Congress's silence as a sign of its actual intent); Marshall, supra note
19, at 185-86 (same). William Eskridge has argued that although the cases use acquiescence as
an indication of actual intent, they are more defensible if rerationalized as an attempt to give
Congress "the institutional burden of responding" to statutory interpretations. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 23, at 108. They create this "institutional burden of response" by adopting a rebuttable presumption that Congress agrees unless it says otherwise. Id.
This argument is a variant of the separation-of-powers rationale, which I discuss in the next
section. See id. at 118-19 (characterizing the "rebuttable presumption" argument as an attempt
to shift responsibility for error correction to Congress, "the better forum").
25 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 32 (1982); cf. WiLLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 220 (1994) (analogizing the significance of legislative silence to Sherlock Holmes's "dog that did not bark").
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approves, the Court, as its faithful agent,
interpretation. 26 And if Congress
27
should not change course.
2.

Separation of Powers

The Court's opinions reflect a second rationale for statutory stare decisis, which I will call the "separation-of-powers" rationale. This rationale rests

on concerns about institutional competence rather than on inferences from
congressional silence. 28 The Supreme Court often justifies statutory stare decisis by explaining that "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in
the area of statutory interpretation, for here .

alter what we have done.

'29

.

. Congress remains free to

Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court

does not usually go on to explain why change is better left to Congress. It

thus takes a more detailed account to unpack the potential connection between separation of powers and statutory stare decisis.
Sometimes, the Supreme Court seems to justify its claim that changes in
statutory interpretation are better left to Congress by comparing statutory
interpretation to constitutional interpretation. 30 The Court frequently notes

that because the Constitution is difficult to amend, the Court is the only one
that can effectively fix its interpretive errors in constitutional law. 31 With
respect to statutory errors, however, the Court notes that change can come32
from Congress (and the President) through the normal legislative process.

26 See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7 ("Congress has not amended the statute to reject
our construction, nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may
assume that our interpretation was correct.").
27 See id.
28 See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255-61 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333
U.S. 445, 450 (1948); Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879).
29 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). The Court has repeatedly quoted Patterson for this proposition. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251
(1998); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 712 n.11 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,284 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689, 700 (1992); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992);
Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490,
499 (1990). The Court has identified Congress as the appropriate actor on other occasions as
well. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1977) (asserting that respect for
precedent ought to be strongest "in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to
change this Court's interpretation of its legislation").
30 For example, the most frequently cited statement of the difference between constitutional and statutory stare decisis puts it this way:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right .... This is
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the federal Constitution,
where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has
often overruled its earlier decisions.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31 See, e.g., id.; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30 (1991).
32 See, e.g., Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406-07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Patterson, 491
Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736-37.
U.S. at 172-73; I1.
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Thus, the Court appears to reason, it should be exceedingly reluctant to revisit statutory precedent.
The Constitution is indisputably difficult to amend, and that might be a
reason for the Court to more readily reconsider its constitutional interpretations-in other words, to give them weaker-than-normal precedential effect. 33 But the difficulty of amending the Constitution does not explain why
the Court ought to give stronger-than-normal precedential effect to statutory
interpretations, as opposed to the normal precedential effect it gives to common law precedents. 34 Indeed, there is no connection whatever between the
conclusion that constitutional precedent should receive weak stare decisis effect and the claim that statutory precedent should be effectively immune
from reconsideration. The validity of the Supreme Court's-and, for that
matter, any federal court's-assertion that Congress is the appropriate actor
in this context should be assessed not by reference to the relative difficulties
of constitutional and statutory amendment, but by comparing the institutional capabilities of Congress and the courts with respect to statutory
interpretation.
When it comes to the institutional capabilities of Congress and the
Court, the Supreme Court's opinions suggest two explanations for its belief
that change is better left to Congress. 35 Congress may be the appropriate
actor as a matter of resource allocation: given congressional availability for
the task, perhaps the Court's resources are better spent elsewhere. 36 Or,
Congress may be the appropriate actor as a matter of constitutional structure: given that the resolution of statutory ambiguity involves policymaking,
perhaps that task is better left to the legislative branch.
A resource-allocation argument based on efficiency is unsatisfying, because it is far from clear that it is more efficient for Congress, rather than the
Court, to correct the Court's statutory mistakes. For one thing, the structural
barriers to change are higher in Congress than in the Court. The Court can
effect change with five votes; a legislative amendment must garner the support of a majority in both houses and the President. For another, the Court
has easier access to evidence of its own statutory mistakes. The Court continually deals with many of the statutes it interprets; the very process of applying precedent (or, through certiorari petitions, seeing how the lower courts
are applying its precedent) gives the Court an opportunity to evaluate
whether a prior statutory interpretation was misguided. Congress, however,
must either make a special effort to monitor Supreme Court interpretations,
33 But see Frank Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in JudicialDecisions, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 422, 429 (1988) (arguing against weak stare decisis in constitutional cases).
34 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35 Cf Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "after a statute has been construed, either by
this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a
meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.
This position reflects both respect for Congress's role and the compelling need to preserve the
courts' limited resources." (citations omitted)).
36 Lawrence Marshall characterizes this argument as the "task-splitting" argument, one
that "allocate[s] the Court's resources (for revisiting precedent) according to the perceived need
for the Court's involvement." Marshall, supra note 19, at 197.
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or rely on others to bring the Court's decisions to its attention. The space on
the Court's agenda is undeniably limited-but that is also true of Congress,
which has a limited amount of time to address a panoply of policy issues.
Getting the attention of either body is an arduous task. If efficiency is the
only consideration, statutory stare decisis has the feel of one busy institution
shifting part of its workload to another. 37 And this is all the more true for the
courts upon which this Article focuses, the courts of appeals. It is difficult to
imagine that it is more efficient for Congress to take responsibility for the
thousands of circuit-level statutory interpretations, rather than leaving any
necessary changes to either the circuits themselves or the Supreme Court.
That is not to say that some other, normative consideration cannot justify the shift. Instead of asking which institution can more efficiently accomplish the task of error correction-an inquiry that could begin an endless
cycle of point-counterpoint-a better question is which body should assume
this task. Even if the Supreme Court is not justified in believing that Congress has more resources to devote to monitoring and fixing its statutory mistakes, the Court may be justified in believing that the legislative branch is
better suited for the job.
This is where the separation-of-powers rationale comes in. The most
compelling explanation for statutory stare decisis casts it as a means of respecting the Constitution's division of power between the legislative and judicial branches. The Supreme Court itself has not itself fully elaborated the
separation-of-powers theme that is implicit in its cases. 38 But others have
attempted to do so. Two leading versions of the separation-of-powers rationale have been proposed, one by Justice Hugo Black and one by Professor
Lawrence Marshall. These two theories are the primary articulations of the
separation-of-powers rationale. I will describe each in turn.
First, Justice Black's theory: Justice Black is closely associated with the
Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis doctrine, for he was one of its most
vocal advocates. 39 He recognized that statutory interpretation inevitably requires the resolution of statutory ambiguity, and that the resolution of statutory ambiguity inevitably requires some degree of policymaking. 40 He was
deeply uncomfortable, however, with the Supreme Court's undertaking any
policymaking role. 41 He grudgingly acknowledged that when the Supreme
Court first interprets a statute, the resolution of statutory ambiguity-and
the attendant policymaking-is "unavoidable in the decision of the case
before it."'42 In subsequent cases, however, Justice Black insisted that the
Supreme Court ought to avoid judicial policymaking by observing statutory
See id. at 198 (making similar point).
For examples of cases in which this theme is implicit, see supra note 29.
39 See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents,supra note 4, at 1397-98 (identifying Justice Black's iteration of the separation-of-powers rationale as the "most celebrated, and forceful,
articulation" of that theory); Marshall, supra note 19, at 208 (calling Justice Black "perhaps the
Court's strongest advocate of a strong rule of statutory stare decisis").
40 Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 236, 257 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
41 Id. at 256-57.
42 Id. at 258.
37

38
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stare decisis.43 His position in this regard is rather extreme. He went so far
as to claim that "[w]hen the law has been settled by an earlier case then any
subsequent 'reinterpretation' of the statute is gratuitous and neither more
nor less than an amendment: it is no different in effect from a judicial altera-

tion of language that Congress itself placed in the statute." 44 Thus, Justice
Black believed that the Supreme Court's deviation from statutory precedent
literally violates the Constitution by usurping legislative power.4 5 Adherence
to statutory precedent, in his view, is a way "to avoid encroaching on the
'46
power of Congress to determine policies and make laws to carry them out.
To the extent that Justice Black perceived a constitutional violation in
the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of a statute, his theory suffers from logical flaws that I will detail in Part ILI. But his basic discomfort with the policymaking inherent in the resolution of statutory ambiguity, and his
perception of statutory stare decisis as a means of curbing such policymaking,
have proven influential, particularly among those scholars and judges who
adopt a textualist approach to statutory interpretation.4 7 Modern textualists

refuse to attribute any significance to congressional inaction following the
Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute. 48 Despite this refusal, many textualists-including those on the Supreme Court-still embrace statutory
stare decisis.49 Lawrence Marshall is the scholar who has advanced the most
50
sustained explanation why.

Lawrence Marshall builds on Justice Black's basic position, but he casts

statutory stare decisis as a constitutionally based policy rather than a constitutional mandate. Like Justice Black, Marshall views the resolution of statutory ambiguity as an exercise in policymaking, and policymaking as the
43
44
45

Id. at 256-58.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 258.

Id. at 256-57.
For a description of the textualist approach, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 14-37 (1997). A hallmark of this approach is the belief that interpretive techniques ought to limit judicial lawmaking. Id. at 17-23.
48 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the "congressional acquiescence" theory). It is worth noting that the "congressional
acquiescence" theory is a relative of the "purposive approach" to statutory interpretation that
textualists emphatically reject. See Manning, supra note 20, at 1689-92 (2004) (describing textualist rejection of purposive approach). The purposive approach assumes that congressional intent or purpose, even though unexpressed in the enacted statutory language, can be a reliable
guide to interpreting statutory text. Id. at 1684. The "congressional acquiescence" theory, which
purports to interpret a statute in light of Congress's unexpressed assent to a prior interpretation,
see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text, proceeds from the same basic assumption.
49 Most commentators consider Justices Scalia and Thomas the Court's most committed
textualists. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2418 n.114
(2003). Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas embrace statutory stare decisis. See, e.g., Rasul
v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2704 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging special force of statutory precedents); Fogerty v. Fantasty, 510 U.S. 517, 538-39 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(same). Other justices, to be sure, also embrace statutory stare decisis. See, e.g., Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792, 804 n.4 (1998) (Souter, J.). I emphasize textualists here because, having explicitly rejected the congressional acquiescence theory, their adherence to the
doctrine necessarily rests on some other ground.
50 See generally Marshall, supra note 19.
46
47
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province of the legislature. 51 Like Justice Black, Marshall thinks it inevitable
that the Supreme Court makes policy when it first interprets a statute. 52 But
unlike Justice Black, Marshall does not view the Supreme Court's deviation
from statutory precedent as a literal transgression upon the legislative power.
Instead, Marshall argues that statutory stare decisis is an interpretive principle derived from, but not required by, the Constitution's separation of
powers.

53

In Marshall's iteration of it, statutory stare decisis functions as a democracy-forcing measure. He sees statutory stare decisis as a way for the Supreme Court to spur Congress to take responsibility for difficult policy calls
left open by statutory language. 54 In fact, to better serve that end, Marshall
proposes that the Supreme Court upgrade its statutory presumption from
"super strong" to "absolute" on the theory that if Congress knows that
change can come only from it-i.e., that the Supreme Court will never overrule its statutory precedents-Congress will be more likely to override statutory interpretations that it does not like. 55 The Supreme Court, perhaps
influenced by Marshall's scholarship, has on at least one occasion advanced a
56
theory for the statutory presumption similar to his. In Neal v. United States,
the Court, refusing to depart from a prior statutory interpretation, explained
that "[wiere we to alter our statutory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes
that are thought to be unwise or unfair. '57 This version of the separation-ofpowers rationale is about creating an incentive for congressional action.
C.

Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals

To this point, my focus has been the Supreme Court. I have described
the super-strong stare decisis effect that the Supreme Court accords its statutory precedent, as well as the rationales-congressional acquiescence and
separation of powers-that the Supreme Court has given for that practice. I
now turn to the point that has been overlooked by the otherwise robust literature on this topic: the courts of appeals apply this doctrine too. A majority
of the circuits has explicitly adopted the super-strong presumption against
overruling statutory precedents, 58 and in those circuits that have never explicId. at 201-06.
Id. at 206-07.
53 Id. at 219-20.
54 Id. at 208-15.
55 Id. at 209-15.
56 Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
57 Id. at 296; see also Comm'r v. Fimk, 483 U.S. 89, 104 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "if Congress understands that as long as a statute is interpreted in a consistent
manner, it will not be reexamined by courts except in the most extraordinary circumstances,
Congress will be encouraged to give close scrutiny to judicial interpretations of its work
product").
58 See, e.g., In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dir.,
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 136 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 1998); Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc); Owen v. Comm'r, No. 78-1341, 1981
51

52
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itly applied the rule, separate opinions assume that it applies.5 9 Only the
Tenth Circuit has remained silent with respect to the super-strong statutory
presumption, and no court of appeals has declined to follow it.
Neither those who support nor those who criticize the Supreme Court's
statutory stare doctrine have noticed, much less questioned, this phenomenon. Nor have the courts of appeals given much thought to whether the doctrine makes sense for them. Instead, there appears to be a widespread
assumption that statutory stare decisis is simply part of our interpretive doclike the plain meantrine-generally applicable to all federal courts-much
60
ing rule or the canons of statutory construction.
To be sure, the statutory presumption operates differently in the courts
of appeals than in the Supreme Court. The most important stare decisis prin61
ciple in the courts of appeals is that one panel cannot overrule another.

When an existing panel decision is on point, the no-panel-overruling rule disposes of the case at hand without the need to consider other stare decisis
principles. 62 Panels that cite the statutory presumption approvingly, therefore, are simply giving an additional reason why they will not overturn precedent. The statutory presumption, however, has real bite when a court of
appeals sits en banc. In that context, the no-panel-overruling rule does not
apply; thus, other principles of stare decisis, including the statutory presumption, determine whether an en banc court will adhere to precedent. Not surprisingly, many of the appellate opinions that discuss statutory stare decisis
63
have been written in en banc cases.

WL 16570, at *9 (6th Cir. June 23, 1981); Cottrell v. Comm'r, 628 F.2d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 1980)
(en banc); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 565 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1977); see
also United States v. Rorie, 58 M.J. 399, 406 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (recognizing that the stare decisis
doctrine is "most compelling" where courts undertake statutory construction).
59 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 327 F.3d 1309, 1331 (11th Cir.
2003) (Black, J., concurring) (citing statutory presumption as an additional reason why court
should not overrule precedent); United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 204-05 (4th Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (Widener, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to apply heightened statutory
presumption); United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1262-66 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1177-78, 1181-84 (9th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (same), overruled on other grounds by Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 265 (1992); Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 219-23 (3d Cir. 1974) (Adams, J., dissenting) (same).
60 The leading Legislation casebook, for example, presents statutory stare decisis this way.
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 599-617. The rule is presented as simply part of our statutory
doctrine, with no discussion of which federal courts do apply, or should apply, the "super-strong"
presumption of statutory stare decisis. Id.
61 See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011,
1017-18 (2003) (describing the impact of the rule, followed in every circuit, that one panel cannot overrule another).
62 See, e.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 543, 553 (3d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that
absent intervening authority, an on-point panel decision is dispositive in subsequent cases);
Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 557 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
63 See Coleman, 158 F.3d at 204 (Widener, J., dissenting); In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1457-58;
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1556, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., dissenting); Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 875-77; Anderson, 885 F.2d at 1256 (Smith, J.,
dissenting); Aguon, 851 F.2d at 1172-76 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); id. at 1177 (Wallace, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fast v. Sch. Dist. of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1034 (8th
Cir. 1984) (en banc); Cottrell, 628 F.2d at 1131.
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Generally speaking, the circuits that have adopted the presumption have
simply assumed without question that since the presumption applies in the
Supreme Court, it must apply in the courts of appeals as well. For example,
in quoting Supreme Court precedent regarding the presumption, the First
Circuit simply substituted "the courts'" for "this Court's" as if the two were
interchangeable. 64 In accusing a majority of the en banc court of disregarding the presumption, Judge Jerry Smith asserted without analysis that "[the
Fifth Circuit] should adhere generally to the same constraints of stare decisis
simply cite Suwhich the [Supreme] Court acknowledges. '65 Most opinions
66
preme Court cases as if they control in this context.
On two occasions, judges sitting in en banc cases have at least raised the
issue whether the Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis principle transfers
automatically to the lower courts. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, has cautioned that although the Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis rule applies
in the courts of appeals, it applies with modifications. 67 Because no single
court of appeals establishes the "ultimate judicial precedent" interpreting a
particular statute, the D.C. Circuit reasoned, a court of appeals must be willing to reconsider a statutory interpretation when a circuit split develops, or
when the en banc court decides that the precedent is "fundamentally
flawed." 68 Similarly, concurring in United States v. Aguon, 69 Judge Reinhardt

cautioned that the Ninth Circuit should not adopt the Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis doctrine wholesale, because "there is a substantial difference between the role of this court and that of the Supreme Court." 70

Even in those instances in which differences between the Supreme Court
and the courts of appeals have been acknowledged, however, the fundamental point that statutory stare decisis should have substantially more bite than
constitutional stare decisis has not been questioned. 71 This is a startling over64 Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 136 F.3d 34, 42 (1st
Cir. 1998) (asserting that "'considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change [the courts'] interpretation of its legislation"'
(quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (emphasis added))).
65 Anderson, 885 F.2d at 1264 (Smith, J., dissenting).
66 See Coleman, 158 F.3d at 204 (Widener, J., dissenting); In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1457-58;
Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor,27 F.3d at
1556, 1558 (Mayer, J., dissenting); Tradewinds, Inc. v. Citibank, No. 81-1424, 1981 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11046, at *16-21 (3d Cir. July 27, 1981) (Adams, J., dissenting); Owen v. Comm'r, No. 781341, 1981 WL 16570, at *25 (6th Cir. June 23, 1981); Cottrell, 628 F.2d at 1131; Gen. Dynamics
Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 565 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1977); Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d
205, 219-23 (3d Cir. 1974) (Adams, J., concurring).
67 Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 876; see also id. at 881 (Randolph, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the different position of federal appellate courts requires modifications in the statutory
stare decisis rule); Richard L. Rainey, Stare Decisis and Statutory Interpretation:An Argument
for a Complete Overruling of the National Parks Test, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1430, 1460-68
(1993) (discussing application of statutory stare decisis in Critical Mass).
68 Critical Mass, 975 F.2d. at 876.
69 United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988).
70 Id. at 1173 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
71 Judge Reinhardt's concurring opinion in Aguon comes close to questioning this point,
but stops short of actually doing it. In Aguon, Judge Reinhardt argued that the courts of appeals
generally have more freedom to overrule precedents than does the Supreme Court. Id. at
1173-76. But he did not dispute that the statutory nature of a precedent is an additional factor
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sight. The statutory presumption is grounded in judgments about how Congress reacts to the Supreme Court. Even assuming that these judgments are
sound, the courts of appeals should not presume that Congress reacts to them
in the same way.
In the next two parts of this Article, I address the question that has been
ignored by both courts and scholars writing in the area: Does it make sense
for the courts of appeals to give statutory precedents a more forceful presumption against overruling? To analyze this question, I will consider
whether either the acquiescence rationale or the separation-of-powers rationale supports the doctrine of statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals.
While I cover both rationales, the separation-of-powers analysis is the heart
of the analysis. The separation-of-powers rationale is the more compelling of
the two rationales for statutory stare decisis in the Supreme Court; thus, statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals must stand or fall upon it.
It is important to emphasize that in considering each of these rationales,
I will neither add to nor exhaustively describe the extensive literature debating the question whether these rationales justify statutory stare decisis in the
Supreme Court. That ground is well traveled, and my focus here is different.
I am particularly interested in the question of how a federal court's position
in the judicial hierarchy might affect its choice to employ an interpretive doctrine like statutory stare decisis. In light of that interest, I assume the basic
validity of the doctrine in the Supreme Court and pursue only the question
whether it works in the courts of appeals. I conclude that at least with respect to this interpretive doctrine, an inferior court ought to pause before
simply adopting the Supreme Court's practice as its own.
1H.

The Acquiescence Rationale in the Courts of Appeals

Even with respect to Supreme Court decisions, the notion that congressional silence following a judicial interpretation constitutes congressional acquiescence in it has been subject to a great deal of scholarly and judicial
criticism. 72 This criticism has been persuasive, and the thrust of the contemporary cases and scholarship is that the separation-of-powers rationale offers
a more promising justification than does congressional acquiescence for the
Supreme Court's statutory stare decisis doctrine. 73 Notwithstanding this state
militating against overruling it, particularly in the absence of conflict among the circuits. Id. at
1173-74.
72 See, e.g., Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 4, at 1402-09; Marshall,
supra note 19, at 184-96. It is worth noting that the topic of legislative inaction spans more
broadly than statutory stare decisis. For example, the Court sometimes interprets congressional
silence in the face of an administrative or lower court statutory interpretation as congressional
acceptance of that interpretation. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
596-692 (1983). It sometimes interprets congressional rejection of particular statutory language
as a sign that Congress did not intend for the statute to cover such a situation. See Eskridge,
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 23, at 84-89 (discussing the "rejected proposal"
cases). And, when Congress reenacts a statute without changing a judicial interpretation, the
Court sometimes interprets reenactment as approval of the existing interpretation. See, e.g.,
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 961-62 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
73 See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 4, at 1402 (noting that commentators more often defend statutory stare decisis with rationales that resonate with the sepa-
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of affairs, the acquiescence rationale continues to garner at least some scholarly and judicial support. Daniel Farber, among other commentators, has defended it. 74 The Supreme Court, while in some cases disparaging the
acquiescence rationale, continues in other cases to rely upon

it.7 5

And the

courts of appeals also occasionally invoke the inference of congressional acquiescence from congressional silence in refusing to overrule circuit-level
statutory interpretations. 76 Given that the acquiescence rationale continues

to enjoy some support in the cases and literature, an analysis of statutory
stare decisis in the courts of appeals would be incomplete without considera-

tion of this rationale. Thus, I will begin by discussing whether a theory of
congressional acquiescence justifies statutory stare decisis in the courts of
appeals.
The traditional critiques of the Supreme Court's use of the acquiescence
rationale can be synthesized under four general headings: ignorance, ambiguity, relevance, and constitutionality. The courts of appeals' use of the acquiescence rationale is subject to these same general criticisms. Indeed, these
criticisms have even more force when considered at the circuit level.
A.

Ignorance

The acquiescence rationale, which assumes that a majority of Congress
supports a particular statutory interpretation, only works if a majority of
Congress knows about the statutory interpretation at issue. Empirical research shows fairly conclusively, however, that Congress is generally unaware
of circuit-level statutory interpretations. Stefanie A. Lindquist and David A.
ration-of-powers principle than with the congressional acquiescence theory); id. at 1397-1402
(describing separation-of-powers arguments); Marshall, supra note 19, at 200 (observing that the
Constitution's separation of powers is the only viable explanation for the doctrine).
74 See Farber, supra note 23, at 8-14 (defending acquiescence); The Supreme Court, 1997
Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 269 (1998) (calling the acquiescence rationale
"perhaps [the] most persuasive" argument for heightened statutory stare decisis).
75 For cases in which the Supreme Court criticizes the acquiescence rationale, see, for example, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292-93 (2001); Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 175 n.1 (1989); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241
(1970); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.
14, 22-24 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940).
For cases in which the Supreme Court relies on acquiescence, see, for example, supra note 23.
See also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 187 (admitting that the Court's cases regarding the
significance of congressional inaction have not been consistent).
76 See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 565 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1977)
(refusing to overturn precedent because, inter alia, "Congress has not amended the Act to provide for a different rule"); Tradewinds, Inc. v. Citibank, No. 81-1424, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS
11046, at *15 (3d Cir. July 27, 1981) (same); Aguon, 851 F.2d at 1178 (Wallace, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the heightened presumption should control, because "[n]either Congress nor the
Supreme Court has ever seen fit ... to overturn the line of authority developed nearly unanimously by the circuits"); see also United States v. Rorie, 58 M.J. 399, 411 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (Effron, J., dissenting) (arguing that where Congress had not disturbed a prior statutory
interpretation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, that court should
not depart from precedent).
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Yalof have performed the most comprehensive study. 77 They reviewed all
bills reported out of committee between 1990 and 1998 that proposed to
override, clarify, or codify statutory interpretations made by the intermediate
federal appellate courts. 78 In that time period, the courts of appeals issued
more than 26,332 opinions. 79 Congress proposed to respond to only 187 of
them and actually responded to only 65 of them.8 0 Lindquist and Yalof conclude that "members of Congress are much less likely to stay informed about
the thousands of statutory decisions rendered by lower federal courts" than
they are about Supreme Court precedents, "which receive relatively full media coverage. '81 Lindquist and Yalof's findings echo those made by William
Eskridge a decade earlier in his well-known study of congressional responses
to the statutory interpretation decisions of the federal courts. 82 Eskridge
found that while Congress was surprisingly responsive to the Supreme Court,
it was surprisingly unresponsive to the courts of appeals.8 3 He asserted that
his study showed "impressive congressional activity in connection with Supreme Court decisions," but "unimpressive knowledge of and response to the
84
far more numerous lower federal court statutory interpretation decisions."
Because Congress lacks actual knowledge of circuit-level statutory interpretations, the acquiescence rationale could only work if the courts of appeals grounded it in a theory of constructive rather than actual knowledge.
In other words, the courts of appeals could try to ground the acquiescence
rationale in the belief that "[i]t is always appropriate to assume that our
elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law," including case
law.8 5
Constructive knowledge, however, sits uneasily in this context. Courts
typically impute constructive knowledge of the law before someone acts or
violates a duty to act. Thus, citizens are expected to inquire about the relevant law before they undertake some action, or fail to undertake some action, in violation of it.86 On this same principle, courts assume that Congress
77 See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, CongressionalResponses to FederalCircuit
Court Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61 (2001).
78 Id. at 63.
79 Id. tbl.1.
80 Id. at 64-65, 68 & tbl.1.

81 Id. at 62; see also id. at 68 (asserting that "any textual theory of statutory interpretation
suggesting that Congress will respond to absurd or incorrect judicial interpretations has little
empirical foundation, at least in the courts of appeals").
82 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Statutory Interpreta-

tion Decisions].

Id. at 337 n.12, 338, 415-16.
Id. at 416; see also Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts
and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 635, 661-62 (1992) (concluding, after a survey, that congressional staff are generally unaware of the D.C. Circuit's statu83

84

tory interpretation opinions).
85 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979). Contra Olson v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 742 (7th Cir. 1986) ("We do not think it realistic 'to assume
that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law,' when 'law' is defined to mean
every judicial gloss, however recherchd, on a technical statute." (citations omitted)).
86 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (noting that constructive knowledge
of the law is imposed on citizens who undertake some activity or who, though passive, find
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acquaints itself with judicial interpretations of a statute before Congress reenacts or amends that statute; in these circumstances, congressional action
provides an occasion for inquiry.8 7 By definition, however, Congress does
not "act" if it simply does not respond to a judicial opinion; nor does Congress have a duty to enact legislation in response to judicial opinions with
which it disagrees. 88 Use of the constructive knowledge principle in this context would assume that elected representatives have a freestanding knowledge of the law-i.e., knowledge of the law in the absence of any impetus for
informing themselves of it. This would be a truly unusual use of the concept
of constructive knowledge.
The Supreme Court, while apparently willing to impute freestanding
constructive knowledge of its own statutory interpretations to Congress, 89 has
themselves in circumstances that give them reason to inquire about a law imposing a duty on
them).
87 For a case relying on the reenactment rule, see, for example, Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975). For cases dealing with congressional amendment, see, for
example, Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998) ("And the force of precedent
here is enhanced by Congress's amendment to the liability provisions of Title VII since the Meritor decision, without providing any modification of our holding."); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782-88 (1985) (asserting that Congress's amendment of a statute
without explicit repudiation of a lower court's interpretation of the statute indicates that Congress accepted the lower court's interpretation); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 384-86 (1983) (similar); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,456 U.S. 353,
378-82 (1982) (similar); Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 445 U.S. 74, 81 nn.6 & 9
(1980) (similar); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-33 (1975) (similar);
and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200-01 (1974) (similar). Of course, if an
amendment addresses a different part of the statute, amendment does not provide an occasion
for Congress's acquainting itself with the courts' interpretation of unrelated language.
88 William Eskridge casts legislative inaction cases (a category broader than, but including,
reliance on legislative inaction to justify statutory stare decisis) as actually creating a congressional duty to act in the event of disagreement with a Supreme Court statutory interpretation.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 249. It would be extraordinary, however, for the judiciary to impose
a duty on Congress that the Constitution does not itself require. Now, it is possible to unhinge
statutory stare decisis from intent. The Court could say that regardless of what Congress intends
by its silence, the more prudent course (for reasons of stability or separation of powers, for
example) is for the Court to adhere to precedent unless it hears otherwise from Congress. But
that is not what the Court says when it invokes the acquiescence rationale. In these cases, the
Court adheres to precedent on the specific ground that Congress has effectively told it do so.
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. Insofar as Eskridge understands the presumption
as giving Congress the institutional burden of response, as he has elsewhere argued, see supra
note 24, his argument is a variant of the separation-of-powers rationale that I will address
shortly.
89 The Supreme Court's invocation of the acquiescence rationale to support statutory stare
decisis appears to bear little relationship to the likelihood that Congress actually knows about
the relevant decision, suggesting that it might rest its own use of the acquiescence rationale on an
inference of constructive knowledge. I have found no decision in which the Court refuses to
apply the heightened stare decisis presumption on the ground that Congress likely lacked actual
knowledge of the Court's prior statutory interpretation. When affirmative evidence of congressional knowledge exists, however, the Court sometimes uses it to bolster the case for using the
presumption. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (arguing that "legislative inattention ... is not a plausible explanation for congressional inaction" because the precedent "was a widely publicized decision that addressed a prominent issue of public debate");
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) (stating that "[w]e
are especially reluctant to reject this presumption in an area that has seen careful, intense, and
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apparently refused to impute constructive knowledge of lower court statutory
interpretations to Congress. When the Court interprets a statute, it sometimes attributes significance to congressional inaction in the face of lower
court interpretations of the same statute-but only when circumstances make
it likely that Congress was actually aware of those decisions. 9 When an inference of actual knowledge is unlikely, the Court typically refuses to give
any significance to legislative inaction. 91
The Court's apparent reluctance to impute constructive knowledge in
this context makes sense. Even assuming that the Supreme Court can fairly
impute constructive knowledge of its opinions to Congress, intermediate appellate opinions pose special difficulties. A court of appeals opinion does not
represent settled law; it represents developing law. Other circuits might go a
different way. Or, the Supreme Court might go a different way if it ultimately takes up the issue. To be sure, one might view the law as relatively
settled if all or most circuits have adopted the same position. But even then,
it is not settled in the way a Supreme Court settles the law. Imposing constructive knowledge of circuit-level statutory interpretations effectively requires Congress to stay abreast of the law not only in its relatively final form,
but also in its various stages of development.
Granted, situations do exist in which courts have imputed constructive
knowledge of circuit opinions, despite their relative fluidity. For example,
courts have generally held that circuit-level opinions can "clearly establish"
the law for purposes of qualified immunity, and courts have imputed knowledge of that "clearly established" circuit level law to government officials
who act or violate a duty to act in violation of the Constitution. 92 Even in the

qualified immunity context, though, deciding when a court of appeals opinion
sustained congressional attention"); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281-84 (1972) (finding heightened deference especially appropriate where Congress had considered and rejected proposals to
"overturn" Court's interpretation); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953)
(same).
90 See Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338 (1988) (inferring
acquiescence when "federal and state courts have held with virtual unanimity over more than
seven decades" that a statute should be interpreted a particular way); Lindahl, 470 U.S. at
782-90 (inferring acquiescence in a lower court case when legislative history cited it); Bloomer,
445 U.S. at 84 (inferring acquiescence when witnesses at hearings brought lower court decisions
to Congress's attention); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-33 (inferring congressional acquiescence when hundreds of lower court cases shared same interpretation); Gulf Oil Corp., 419 U.S.
at 200-01 (inferring congressional acquiescence when lower courts interpreted a statute consistently for four decades); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 412-13 & n.13 (1962) (inferring acquiescence where Congress received a report of the relevant lower court decision); cf. Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (inferring acquiescence in IRS rules when Congress was "aware-acutely aware" of those rulings). None of these cases, of course, is an instance of statutory stare decisis, because none is a case in which the Court relies on acquiescence
to decide whether to adhere to its own precedent.
91 See Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 614-17 (1981) (refusing to infer
congressional acquiescence in the statutory interpretation of one circuit); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55 n.13 (1964) (similar).
92 See, e.g., Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1032 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(asserting that the Eleventh Circuit cases can clearly establish the law in the Eleventh Circuit).
But see Schlothauer v. Robinson, 757 F.2d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1985) (strongly implying that
only Supreme Court decisions, not decisions from the Eighth Circuit, clearly establish the law).
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clearly establishes the law is not without difficulty, and courts struggle with
the question. 93 While courts are sometimes willing to impute constructive
knowledge of lower court opinions, constructive knowledge in this context is
certainly a heavier burden to impose. And it bears repeating that courts only
impose constructive knowledge on someone who acts or violates a duty to
act. Congress has no duty to "overrule" legislatively those statutory interpretations with which it disagrees; nor, of course,94 does Congress have any duty
to stay abreast of court of appeals decisions.
In sum, Congress's general lack of actual knowledge of circuit opinions
and the unreasonableness of imposing constructive knowledge in this context
drastically limit the number of cases in which the inference of congressional
approval from congressional silence is at all plausible in the court of appeals
context.
B. Ambiguity
For the acquiescence rationale to work, Congress must not only know
about the relevant judicial opinion, but it must be reasonable for the court to
interpret Congress's post-opinion silence as satisfaction with the opinion.
The very unreasonableness of this inference is the primary reason that commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's reliance on legislative inaction. Their criticism, persuasive in the context of the Supreme Court, only
gains more force when applied to the courts of appeals.
Congressional silence is meaningless. Does it signal acquiescence in a
judicial interpretation or an unwillingness to expend political capital to fix
the error? 95 A host of explanations other than congressional approval of an
opinion may account for legislative inaction. For example, Congress may fail
to legislate on the topic in question because other measures "have a stronger
claim on the limited time and energy of the [legislative] body. '96 Or, legislators may believe that a "bill is sound in principle but politically inexpedient
93 For example, the Eleventh Circuit refuses to consider cases from other circuits in determining whether the law was "clearly established." Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1033 n.10 (asserting that
cases from other circuits cannot "clearly establish" the law for officials acting in the Eleventh
Circuit because "[w]e do not expect public officials to sort out the law of every jurisdiction in the
country"). Other circuits, however, will take out-of-circuit case law into account. See, e.g., Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 879 (6th Cir. 2003); McClendon v. Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329-30
(5th Cir. 2002). The courts also struggle to define the effect of a circuit split on the state of the
law. Compare Rivero v. San Francisco, 316 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2002) (strongly asserting that
the existence of a circuit split does not undermine the clarity of the law in the Ninth Circuit when
the Ninth Circuit has taken sides in the split), with Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 944 (7th Cir.
2000) (observing that a circuit split might undermine the clarity of the law in the Seventh Circuit
even when the Seventh Circuit had taken sides in the split).
94 See supra note 88.
95 See Eskridge, InterpretingLegislative Inaction, supra note 23, at 98-99; Marshall, supra
note 19, at 190-91 (discussing numerous explanations for inaction that may apply "even to a
Congress full of legislators who are acutely aware of, and strongly disagree with, a court decision
construing an act of Congress").
96 Marshall, supra note 19, at 190 (quoting H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1393-1401 (tentative ed. 1958) (unpublished
manuscript)).

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 73:317

to be connected with. ' 97 Or, legislators may tentatively approve, but believe
that "action should be withheld until the problem can be attacked on a
broader front. '98 The list of possible explanations goes on. Numerous obstacles, both procedural and practical, hinder the passage of legislation, and, as a
result, even a legislature with a majority that vehemently disagrees with a
judicial decision may fail to act on its disagreement. Equating the failure to
act with agreement reflects a simple and complete misunderstanding of the
legislative process. 99

This misunderstanding undercuts reliance on acquiescence for either the
Supreme Court or a court of appeals. For a court of appeals, though, the
unsettled nature of intermediate appellate opinions further exacerbates the
problem. Does congressional silence in the face of an Eighth Circuit opinion
signal agreement with that decision? Or does it mean that Congress is waiting to see what other circuits do or whether the Supreme Court takes the
issue? Or does it mean that Congress does not think that a decision of the
Eighth Circuit, even one incorrectly interpreting a statute, is worth spending
political capital to fix? Worse, what is a court to make of congressional silence in the face of circuit conflict? 100 In short, the argument that congressional silence raises an inference of acquiescence in a court of appeals
decision is simply unsustainable.
C. Relevance
In addition to the problems of ignorance and ambiguity, commentators
have raised a relevancy objection to the Supreme Court's use of the acquiescence rationale that is equally applicable to the courts of appeals. 10 1 Both the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have asserted repeatedly that the
intent of the Congress that enacted a statute controls the interpretation of
97

Id.

98 Id.
99 Cf Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
'complicated check on legislation' erected by our Constitution creates an inertia that makes it

impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents (1)
approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo,
(3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice." (citations omitted)); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,50 U. CHi. L. REv. 533, 538
(1983) (noting that "[tihere are a hundred ways in which a bill can die even though there is no
opposition to it").
100 Even where they otherwise follow the presumption, some circuits have noted that the
existence of a circuit split complicates its application. See United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d
1248, 1255 n.12 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (asserting that "congressional silence is not of great
significance, given the split in the circuits"); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (arguing that a circuit split eliminates the
basis for applying the statutory presumption); id. at 881 (Randolph, J., concurring) (same);
United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (same); EEOC v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 60 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1995) (Ripple, J.,
concurring) (same).
101 Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 23, at 95-96 (noting the inconsistency between the Court's disapproval of subsequent legislative history and its acceptance of
subsequent legislative inaction); Marshall, supra note 19, at 193-95 (same).
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the statute.102 For this reason, the federal courts will not consider post-enactment legislative history when they interpret a statute. 0 3 As the Supreme
Court has explained, "'[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."1°4 Yet the acquiescence
rationale relies not on the intent of the enacting Congress, but on the intent
of subsequent Congresses whose inaction may ratify the Court's statutory
gloss. If the intent of the enacting Congress is what counts, why should a
court take account of what later Congresses think or whether they decline to
act? 10 5 The supposed acquiescence of a later Congress is simply irrelevant.
D.

Daniel Farber'sAlternative Way

To avoid, or at least soften, the problems of ignorance, ambiguity, and
irrelevance that plague the acquiescence rationale, Daniel Farber has advanced a creative "veil of ignorance" argument to defend the Supreme
Court's reliance on congressional inaction. 10 6 He argues that if asked at the
time of enactment, legislators would express a preference for a rule of statutory interpretation that attributes significance to legislative inaction-a category broader than, but including, statutory stare decisis. 107 Ex ante,
legislators cannot know whether judicial interpretations will unduly benefit
or unduly hurt their side of the legislative bargain. 0 8 Because they can expect as many errors to benefit as hurt their policy preferences over time and
across many statutes, legislators would not be particularly concerned about
leaving statutory misinterpretations on the books. 1°9 They would be con-

cerned, however, about the social costs imposed by a weak form of stare
decisis-one permitting corrections despite evidence of legislative acquies-

cence in the supposed error." 0 Uncertainty breeds difficulty in planning
102 See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
355 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "expressions of legislative intent made years after
the statute's initial enactment are entitled to limited weight under any circumstances, even when
the post-enactment views of Congress as a whole are evident"); Tax & Accounting Software
Corp. v. United States, 301 F.3d 1254, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that "Congress cannot
retroactively change the meaning and intent of previously enacted statutory language through
the introduction of legislative history which purports to state what the original meaning of that
statutory language was"); N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Shalala, 172 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(holding that "subsequent legislative history is an 'unreliable guide to legislative intent"') (citations omitted).
103 See supra note 102.
104 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 118 (quoting United States v. Price, 361
U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
105 Cf. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the acquiescence rationale is "based ... on the patently false premise that the correctness of
statutory construction is to be measured by what the current Congress desires, rather than by
what the law as enacted meant"); see also Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 427 (asserting that
"think[ing] of Congress as a discontinuous body... affects the theory of precedent").
106 Farber, supra note 23, at 8-14.
107 Id. at 11-14.
108 Id. at 11-12.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 12-13.
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transactions as well as increased litigation."' In addition, the Court's failure
to take future congressional approval of statutory interpretations into account increases the resources that Congress may have to devote to considering and perhaps enacting legislative overrides. 1 2 Because legislators would
prefer a rule that reduces uncertainty to a rule that permits the Court to
resurrect and enforce the original legislative bargain, the argument goes,
treating congressional silence as acquiescence does advance congressional
1 13

desires.

Even assuming that Farber accurately predicts legislative preferences
vis-A-vis the Supreme Court, his argument has no apparent application to
statutory stare decisis at the court of appeals level. (Nor, importantly, does
Farber argue that it does.) First, Farber's argument rests on his assertion that
congressional silence, even if not conclusive, is at least probative of congressional approval. 114 As others have argued, however, that is simply not the
case-inaction could mean anything, perhaps including approval, but certainly not necessarily or even likely SO. 11 5 Given that alternative explanations
for congressional silence are even more forceful vis-A-vis the courts of appeals than the Supreme Court, 116 the probative value of silence is so weak as
to be useless at the inferior court level. Second, it is not clear that legislators
would have the same ex ante preference in favor of strong, acquiescencebased stare decisis, because they do not receive the same benefit in return for
relinquishing their attachment to the original legislative deal. Strong stare
decisis in a court of appeals does not provide the same overall certainty in
planning or reduced litigation, because the possibility always exists that other
circuits-or the Supreme Court-could decide the case differently. Nor does
strong stare decisis in a court of appeals greatly reduce the risk that Congress
will have to devote legislative resources to considering an override, because
the risk that Congress would step in to override an intermediate court's interpretation is already low. 11 7 Given that the benefits are reduced in this context, legislators behind Farber's veil of ignorance may well reach a different
calculus. Even if they would prefer that the Supreme Court adopt superstrong stare decisis, it is far from certain that they would choose a similar
course for the courts of appeals.
E. ConstitutionalImpediments
Finally, commentators have raised a constitutional objection to the Supreme Court's use of the acquiescence rationale that also applies to its use by
111 Id. at 12.
112
113

Id. at 13.

Id. at 13. But see Marshall, supra note 19, at 198-200 (pointing out flaws in Farber's
theory, even as applied to the Supreme Court); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably
Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 73-76 (2001) (same).
114 Farber, supra note 23, at 10.
115 See Marshall, supra note 19, at 191 (arguing that even in the Supreme Court context,
"logical relevance does not demonstrate that the probability of congressional agreement is sufficient to support any form of a presumption of congressional acquiescence").
116 See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (asserting that Congress responds to relatively
few circuit opinions).
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the courts of appeals.118 On the one hand, when a court interprets a statute
to mean "X," the acquiescence rationale permits Congress, through its silence, to respond "Yes, we meant 'X."' (For present purposes, I am putting
aside all other objections to the acquiescence rationale, including the relevance of what a later Congress thinks.) On the other hand, the acquiescence
rationale also permits Congress, by legislatively "overruling" a statutory interpretation, to respond "We did not mean 'X' at the time, but 'X' sounds
good to us now." With only silence to go on, a court cannot know which
message Congress is sending, and the latter message runs headlong into the
Constitution. As commentators have repeatedly emphasized and I will
briefly describe here, permitting the inaction of a current Congress to ratify a
potential departure from the statutory scheme circumvents the constitutional
limits on the legislative process.
Congress can only legislate through the constitutionally prescribed process of bicameralism and presentment.1 9 Silence cannot satisfy the requirement of bicameralism. Without a vote, it is impossible to tell whether a
majority of both houses supports a measure. And even assuming that silence
could somehow satisfy the requirement of bicameralism, ratification by inaction circumvents the requirement of presentment. If Congress's silence is
given legal effect, Congress effectively can amend an existing statute without
ever giving the President the opportunity to veto the amendment.12 0 The
acquiescence rationale assumes that Congress's view about the meaning of a
statute is the only relevant view; Congress, however, is not the only body
with a role in making or amending statutes. The acquiescence rationale
wholly overlooks the Executive's role in the legislative process.
III. The Separation-of-PowersRationale in the Courts of Appeals
Congressional acquiescence-a theory on shaky ground in the Supreme
Court-runs into even more trouble in the courts of appeals. With the underbrush of the acquiescence rationale cleared away, we can consider the
more promising justification for statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals: the separation-of-powers rationale. The idea that the constitutional
separation of powers requires or at least militates in favor of statutory stare
decisis runs through Supreme Court opinions, and the courts of appeals echo
it. If statutory stare decisis can be justified in the courts of appeals, it must
stand or fall on this ground.
118 See Eskridge, InterpretingLegislative Inaction, supra note 23, at 96-97 (identifying constitutional difficulties with attributing legal significance to legislative inaction); Marshall, supra
note 19, at 194 (same).
119 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 7, cl.2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-59 (1983).
120 See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) (refusing to give effect to congressional acquiescence because, inter alia, "Congress may legislate ... only through the passage
of a bill which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President" (citations omitted));
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 n.4 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (stating that "in
view of the specific and constitutional procedures required for the enactment of legislation, it
would seem hardly justifiable to treat as having legislative effect any action or nonaction not
taken in accordance with the prescribed procedures"); Nelson, supra note 113, at 76-77.
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As explained in Part I, existing case law and commentary offer two different versions of the separation-of-powers rationale, one advanced by Justice Hugo Black and the other advanced by Professor Lawrence Marshall. In
this section, I consider whether either Justice Black's or Lawrence Marshall's
understanding justifies statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals. After
concluding that neither does, I then consider the possibility of a third version
of the separation-of-powers rationale, one not articulated in existing scholarship or case law. I argue that statutory stare decisis is best understood not as
a constitutional mandate, as Justice Black described it; nor as a means of
spurring congressional action, as Professor Marshall describes it; but instead,
as a simple restraint on judicial policymaking derived from, but not required
by, the Constitution's separation of powers. I find this explanation of statutory stare decisis more compelling, but conclude that it also ultimately fails to
justify statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals.
A.

Justice Black's Theory

Recall that Justice Black, the justice who has most clearly articulated a
separation-of-powers theory for statutory stare decisis, insisted that the Constitution gives the legislative branch the exclusive authority to correct statutory mistakes. According to Justice Black, "[W]hen this Court first interprets
a statute, then the statute becomes what this Court has said it is. '' 12 1 Justice
Black believed that to alter that language is a legislative function, a task that
Article I vests in Congress. 122 Congress, unlike the Court, is an elected body,
and Congress, unlike the Court, is capable of responding to political pressure
and of performing the investigation required to develop policy. 1 23 Thus, the
Court "should interject itself as little as possible into the law-making and law-

changing process 1 24 Justice Black's argument has been persuasive to some
125
circuit judges, who have invoked it in asserting the statutory presumption.
121 Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 257 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting). The Court has sounded a similar theme in other cases. See Francis v. S. Pac. Co.,
333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948) (stating that "[w]e find the long and well-settled construction of the Act
plus reenactment of the free-pass provision without change of the established interpretation
most persuasive indications that the ... [judicial interpretation] has become part of the warp and
woof of the legislation"); Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879) (holding that
"[a]fter a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as
contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself,
and a change of decision is to all intents and purposes the same in its effect on contracts as an
amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment").
122 Boys Mkts., 398 U.S. at 258 (Black, J., dissenting).
123 Id.
124 Id.; see also Frank E. Horack, Jr., CongressionalSilence: A Tool of JudicialSupremacy,
25 TEX. L. REV. 247, 250-51 (1947) (making a similar "judicial amendment" argument to support statutory stare decisis).
125 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[o]nce the meaning of an enactment is discerned
and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end" (quotation omitted));
United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1265 & n.ll (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (noting the "colorable argument" that altering a prior statutory interpretation violates the separation-of-powers principle, "as any subsequent change of position has the practical
effect of amending the statute, an act that is legislative rather than judicial in nature");
Tradewinds, Inc. v. Citibank, No. 81-1424, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11046, at *20 (3d Cir. July 27,
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Justice Black's analysis, however, is patently flawed.1 26 He does not
identify the force that transforms an initial judicial interpretation into statutory text; nor does he explain why the very same act of judicial interpretation
violates Article I in one context but not another. As William Eskridge asks:
"Why should an errant initial interpretation of legislative expectations be
considered acceptable judicial lawmaking, and a later, corrective interpreta'127
tion be considered usurpation?
The premise that an initial judicial interpretation of statutory language
becomes an actual part of the statute itself is particularly strained in the court
of appeals context, where different circuits can interpret the same language
differently. Does the interpretation of a single circuit become temporarily
part of the statute subject to the development of a conflict? When there is a
conflict, does the statute revert to its "original form" until the Supreme Court
steps in to resolve the conflict? Or, do court of appeals statutory interpretations become part of the "warp and woof" of a statute only once some number of circuits weighs in and agrees? If so, what is the tipping point?
The court of appeals context also underscores the logical difficulties of
distinguishing between "initial interpretations," which are "unavoidable" and
therefore permissible in Justice Black's view, and "reinterpretations," which
are avoidable and therefore impermissible.12 8 Once one circuit has interpreted an ambiguity, are not all later interpretations, even those from other
circuits, unnecessary? Indeed, once any federal court at any level of the judicial hierarchy fills a gap, are not all interpretations in later cases, even from a
superior court, strictly speaking, "unnecessary?" The longstanding stare decisis structure of the federal courts provides that one circuit does not bind
another, and that vertical stare decisis is a one-way obligation running from
superior to inferior courts. 129 Adopting Justice Black's strong separation-ofpowers view would require the federal courts either to define "necessity"
artificially (e.g., by saying that it is "necessary" for each precedential component of the federal court system to define a statutory term for itself) or to
depart radically from the existing stare decisis structure. In short, Justice
Black's position cannot justify statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals.

1981) (Adams, J.,
concurring) (arguing that "we should abstain from usurping the congressional
power of altering or amending legislation"); Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 219-20 (3d Cir.
1975) (Adams, J., dissenting) (asserting that "a court, in altering its interpretation of the meaning to be derived from the words of the statute, encroaches on the power of Congress to enact or
amend legislation").
126 Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents,supra note 4, at 1398-1400; Marshall, supra
note 19, at 209 (stating that "[tiaken alone, Justice Black's position appears to be a bit shallow").
127 Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 4, at 1399.
128 Boys Mkts., 398 U.S. at 257-58 (Black, J., dissenting).
129 See, e.g., Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(describing horizontal stare decisis in the federal courts); Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994) (describing vertical
stare decisis in the federal courts).
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B. Statutory Stare Decisis as a Spur to Legislative Action
Recall Lawrence Marshall's more convincing account of the separationof-powers reason for the statutory presumption. 130 Marshall recognizes that
some policymaking is an inevitable part of statutory interpretation, both because it is impossible to completely eliminate ambiguity from language and
because ambiguity is the inevitable result of legislative bargaining.13' He argues that it should be as small a part as possible, however, because any judicial policymaking is necessarily countermajoritarian. 132 While it may not
violate any express constitutional command, such policymaking is in serious
tension with the constitutional structure, and the Court should seek to limit
it. 133 Marshall's proposed way of limiting it is for the Supreme Court to shift
the policymaking responsibility back to Congress by making statutory stare
decisis an absolute rule. 134 According to Marshall, if the Court makes clear
that it is absolutely unwilling to revisit statutory interpretations, both Congress and other parties interested in an issue will know that change can only
come from the legislature. 135 Marshall claims that such line-drawing will
make it more likely that Congress will rely on the democratic rather than the
judicial process to resolve statutory ambiguities.
But Marshall limits his proposal to the Supreme Court, and it is easy to
see why. 136 In Marshall's view, statutory stare decisis aims to evoke a con-

gressional response; at the intermediate appellate level, a number of factors
sap the likelihood of a meaningful congressional response. That is not to say
that Congress never responds to statutory interpretations of the courts of
appeals. Sometimes, it does. 137 But a theory of statutory stare decisis that
assumes a norm of congressional response to the courts of appeals is deeply
flawed.
For one thing, an information deficit exists. As discussed above, Congress tends not to know about the courts of appeals' statutory interpreta130 See Marshall, supra note 19, at 200-19; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the
Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2450, 2453-66 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Amorous Defendant] (criticizing Marshall's theory);
Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2467 (1990) (responding to Eskridge).
131 Marshall, supra note 19, at 206-07.
132 Id. at 207.
133 Id. at 201-08, 220-21 (arguing that "the nonmajoritarian aspect of judicial lawmaking
should have a 'conditioning influence' in the Court's formulation of stare decisis rules" (footnotes omitted)); cf. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV.
501, 540 (1948) (asserting that statutory stare decisis "places the responsibility where it belongs"). But see Eskridge, Amorous Defendant, supra note 130, at 2458-66 (disputing both that
policymaking is reserved for the legislature and that judicial involvement is democracyenhancing).
134 Marshall, supra note 19, at 208.
135 Id. at 209-15. But see Eskridge, Amorous Defendant, supra note 130, at 2453-58 (disputing that the Supreme Court's adoption of an absolute rule would succeed in spurring congressional response).
136 Marshall, supra note 19, at 216. Marshall does not say whether the Court's current
version of statutory stare decisis (as opposed to the absolute statutory stare decisis that Marshall
advocates) has any role in the lower courts.
137 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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tions. 138 A prerequisite to congressional action, therefore, is missingCongress cannot respond to errors about which it is unaware. Defenders of
the "congressional incentive" theory might respond that actual knowledge
does not matter. Unlike the acquiescence theory, the "congressional incentive" theory does not rely on what Congress already knows; instead, it relies
on what the courts hope to inspire Congress to learn. Part and parcel of
motivating Congress to respond to the statutory interpretations of the courts
of appeals is motivating Congress to monitor these decisions.
Motivating Congress to monitor and respond to the statutory interpretations of the courts of appeals, however, is an uphill battle. Congress's current
unawareness of circuit opinions suggests at the very least that affirmative
steps must be taken to inform Congress if this factor is to support statutory
stare decisis; the knowledge obviously is not present in Congress as a matter
of course.1 39 It might be reasonable for the Supreme Court to attempt to
spur Congress to monitor the relatively few statutory interpretation opinions
it publishes each term. 140 Together, however, the courts of appeals issue
simply not manageable
thousands of statutory interpretations a year. 141 It is
42
for Congress to stay on top of this many opinions.1
Even if Congress could manage the circuit caseload, other factors decrease Congress's incentive to monitor and respond. Most important is the
relatively small impact that any single court of appeals can have on the national scene. When the Supreme Court interprets a statute, Marshall's "congressional incentive" theory assumes that Congress will act because Congress
knows that change can only come from it. 143 When a court of appeals issues a
decision, however, Congress knows that change may also originate from another source: the Supreme Court. I do not take a position here on whether it
is appropriate for the Supreme Court to "discipline" the democratic process
by forcing Congress to resolve statutory interpretation disputes through legislation. 144 Assuming, however, that it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to
perform this sort of disciplining function, it is hard to see how a court of
appeals could effectively play this role. The Supreme Court can hope to elicit
a congressional response because it has the last word. The courts of appeals
lack the ability to elicit a congressional response because they do not. If
See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
140 See Eskridge, Overriding Statutory InterpretationDecisions, supra note 82, at 339 n.15
(noting that the Supreme Court issued about eighty statutory interpretations per year during the
period covered by Eskridge's study); Marshall, supra note 19, at 216 n.181 (noting that the Court
decided sixty-four statutory cases in its 1986 Term).
141 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
142 Cf James J. Brudney, CongressionalCommentary on Judicial Interpretationsof Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MicH. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994) (stating that "Congress could not
possibly modify or reject in text each statutory interpretation decision with which it has serious
concerns and still have time to transact any other legislative business").
143 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
144 Cf Jane Schacter, Metademocracy, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593, 609, 642-46 (1995) (using
the phrase "disciplinarian approach" to describe approaches to statutory interpretation designed
to influence or modify legislative behavior).
138
139
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statutory stare decisis is a task-shifting mechanism, the courts of appeals gen145
erally lack the leverage to shift the task effectively.
An individual circuit's leverage over Congress is also decreased by the
limited geographical reach of its opinions. A Supreme Court statutory interpretation binds the whole nation; thus, incentives potentially exist for any
member of Congress (not to mention the President and interest groups) to
support legislation overriding a Supreme Court opinion that undercuts that
legislator's (or the President's or the interest groups') preferred statutory "
policy. When the First Circuit interprets a statute, however, what incentive
does a senator from California have to introduce or support legislation to
override a judicial opinion that affects a small portion of the East Coast and
Puerto Rico? Common sense dictates that decisions not affecting a legislator's constituents are not likely to be at the top of her agenda; nor will the
President or a national interest group necessarily take an interest in a decision with parochial effect. And even when a legislator has real concerns
about one circuit's position, the limited geographical impact of the decision
may dissuade her from acting, or inhibit her efforts to convince her colleagues to act. When one circuit speaks, Congress may well prefer to wait
1 46
and see what other circuits say before devoting resources to an override.
To be sure, it would be an overstatement to say that Congress never has
an incentive to respond to the lower courts, for Congress does override some
lower court decisions.1

47

Given that Congress is less likely to know about,

much less respond to, lower court decisions than Supreme Court decisions,
however, the incentive to override a lower court decision is necessarily limited. 148 Congress may have an incentive to act when a number of circuits
145 Cf Einer Elhauge, Preference-ElicitingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2225 (2002) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court is far more likely to provoke congressional
overrides than lower courts").
146 The data compiled by Lindquist and Yalof offers some support for the notion that Congress is likely to wait to see what other circuits do. Lindquist and Yalof found that Congress
proposed to respond, either positively or negatively, to 187 appeals court cases. Lindquist &
Yalof, supra note 77, at 63-64. Of those 187 cases, 66 were instances of circuit conflict that
Congress introduced legislation to resolve, Id. Lindquist and Yalof do not isolate whether congressional overrides in the remaining cases were aimed at the decision of a single circuit, or a
position on which several circuits concurred. Eskridge's data regarding lower court overrides is
also silent with respect to this distinction. See generally Eskridge, Overriding Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 82.
147 See generally Lindquist & Yalof, supra note 77 (studying the frequency and type of
congressional responses, including overrides, to the decisions of the courts of appeals). See also
Eskridge, supra note 82, at 338 & tbl.1 (noting that Congress overrides or modifies statutory
decisions by lower courts as well as decisions by the Supreme Court).
148 Lindquist and Yalof argue that the speed and relative infrequency of congressional reactions to the courts of appeals' decisions suggest that Congress relies on a system of "fire-alarm
monitoring" of judicial statutory interpretations. Lindquist & Yalof, supra note 77, at 67 (citations omitted). That is, rather than systematically watching all judicial decisions, Congress relies
on "complaints ('alarms') by lobbyists from organized groups to trigger oversight." Id. As the
term "fire-alarm monitoring" implies, interest groups are not likely to press for an override of
every lower court loss, only of those perceived to be "fires." Cf Eskridge, OverridingStatutory
InterpretationDecisions, supra note 82, at 363 ("[An interest] group's ability to place an issue on
the legislative agenda does not ensure that the group will do so. There are many reasons endogenous to the political process why a group might not press a statutory issue that it lost in court.").
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have either joined in or divided over a particular statutory interpretation.1 49
In that case, Congress might speak to express its disagreement with what has
become a well-established judicial position, or to resolve the uncertainty created by a circuit split.150 Congress may also have an incentive to act when a
"specialty" circuit speaks-for example, when the Second Circuit decides an
important securities case, the D.C. Circuit an important administrative law
case, or the Federal Circuit an important patent case. 151 Because "specialty"
circuits tend to have the last word on issues arising within their fields, such
decisions have influence beyond the borders of the circuit and may more
easily command congressional attention and response.1 52 Or, Congress may
have an incentive to act when a particular statutory interpretation, though
isolated, is of enough strategic or symbolic importance to rile an influential
153
interest group.

The fact that Congress has an incentive to respond to a subset of lower
court decisions, however, does not justify the presumption that Congress has
an incentive to respond to all, or even most, of them. A "presumption" applicable in only a few circumstances is not a generally applicable "presump149 See Comm'r v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 104 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that a
long, consistent line of lower court decisions should give Congress an incentive to act if it disagrees); Lindquist & Yalof, supra note 77, at 66 (noting instances of congressional overrides to
resolve circuit conflicts).
150 See supra note 149.
151 A circuit's "specialty" may be jurisdictional. For example, statutes frequently grant the
D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over various administrative matters, and the Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction over various patent matters. Or, a specialty might be an accident of
geography. For example, the Second Circuit decides relatively more securities cases simply because the New York Stock Exchange is located within that circuit. For this reason, Justice Blackmun called the Second Circuit "the 'Mother Court' of securities law." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152 Lindquist and Yalof's data shows that Congress responded to more opinions from the
D.C. Circuit than any other. Congress overrode, clarified, or codified roughly eighteen percent
of the D.C. Circuit's opinions. Lindquist & Yalof, supra note 77, at 64. The numbers from the
Ninth Circuit are not far behind: Congress responded to fifteen percent of the Ninth Circuit's
opinions. Id. The closest percentage after the Ninth Circuit is the nine percent to which Congress responded from both the Second and the Seventh Circuits. Id. Contrast these numbers
with the four percent of opinions to which Congress responded from the Fourth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits. Id. Lindquist and Yalof opine that Congress responds to a high percentage of
D.C. Circuit opinions because the D.C. Circuit "renders most of its decisions in regulatory matters of central concern to important legislative programs." Id. That may be. Another explanation, though, is that regulatory statutes often grant exclusive review to the D.C. Circuit; thus, the
D.C. Circuit has the first and, subject to Supreme Court review, the last judicial word on many, if
not most, administrative matters. See Patricia Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Partof the
Solution, or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 647 (1994) (noting that Congress
typically designates the D.C. Circuit as the exclusive forum for review of administrative rules).
Lindquist and Yalof explain the high percentage of responses to the Ninth Circuit by pointing to
the fact that the Ninth Circuit issues more opinions than any other circuit. Lindquist & Yalof,
supra note 77, at 64. That may be. But another explanation is that because the Ninth Circuit is
the largest circuit, its decisions tend to affect more people than the decisions of most circuits.
Thus, members of Congress should have more interest in responding to these decisions.
153 For example, Lindquist and Yatof observe that Congress overrides a relatively high percentage of the interpretations of environmental statutes issued by the courts of appeals, and they
speculate that it does so because of the influence of interest groups like the Sierra Club and the
Natural Resources Defense Council. Lindquist & Yalof, supra note 77, at 65.
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tion." It may be a factor that courts consider when circumstances suggest it,
but it is not a principle justifying an across-the-board doctrinal approach.
Another factor worth considering is whether Congress should be primarily responsible for monitoring and changing wayward court of appeals statutory interpretations. Institutionally, it makes more sense for the Supreme
Court to assume this role. By virtue of its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme

Court supervises the judgments of the lower federal courts; its primary function is to monitor and correct errors that lower courts (and state courts)
make in interpreting federal law. 154 Congress, which creates the lower courts
and defines the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, is the body that designed this system. Accordingly, it would be at least reasonable to infer that

Congress expects the Supreme Court to bear the burden of monitoring and
response vis-A-vis the lower courts, leaving Congress free to monitor and respond to only the Supreme Court's relatively small docket. Of course, Con-

gress may override lower court interpretations to the extent Congress is
interested in particular issues or the opinions otherwise come to its attention.
The courts of appeals should not, however, expect Congress to perform a job
that Congress has structurally allocated to the Supreme Court through the
appellate review process.
If this description adequately captures Congress's expectations, one

might then wonder whether the Supreme Court is performing-or, given resource limitations, is even capable of performing-the job that Congress has
apparently allocated to it. Congress is presumably concerned about whether
the lower courts are interpreting its statutes correctly; the Supreme Court is
generally concerned about resolving splits rather than merely correcting errors. 155 If Congress primarily monitors the Supreme Court's docket, and the
Supreme Court does not take up statutory errors, then those errors will likely
escape congressional attention. Perhaps, then, the courts of appeals should
try to get Congress to react directly to them.
This response has some surface appeal, but upon analysis becomes less
persuasive. One way to understand the Court's certiorari practice is that it
uses disagreement among the circuits as proxies for interpretive error. If
only one or two courts have addressed a statutory ambiguity, and if they have
interpreted that ambiguity the same way, the Court has to engage in relatively close scrutiny to detect errors in the lower courts' reasoning. Performing that scrutiny for every certiorari petition would be time consuming and,
with limited lower court input on the issue and the press of other work, the
Court would be at greater risk of making interpretive errors itself. For efficiency's sake, it relies on the process of "percolation" to separate cases that
154 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV.
4, 65 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court sees "its role as principally one of promoting uniformity in the interpretation of federal law").
155 See Sup. CT. R. 10.1(a) (noting that a conflict between one court of appeals and another, or between a court of appeals and a state supreme court, is a reason for the Court's
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 193
(7th ed. 1993) (explaining that the Supreme Court will not typically grant certiorari simply because the decision below is wrong).
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merit review from those that do not. 156 The emergence of a circuit split signals a need for the Court's intervention, for when a split exists, so does error:
in resolving a split, the Court necessarily declares some courts on the wrong
side of the interpretive divide. By contrast, if the circuits agree, error-while
certainly not impossible-is at least less likely. The fact that the circuits are
arriving at the same conclusion suggests that they are arriving at the right
conclusion.
Given the volume of circuit opinions, and the press of its other business,
Congress is no more capable than the Supreme Court of engaging in close
scrutiny of every single statutory interpretation released by a court of appeals. 157 If Congress took primary responsibility for monitoring lower court
statutory interpretations, it too would have to rely on proxies for error. Indeed, the most comprehensive study of congressional responses to circuit
opinions indicates that to the extent that Congress currently monitors the
158
circuits at all, it already relies on proxies rather than case-by-case study.
For example, Congress is more likely to respond to the courts of appeals
when a split exists, or when interest groups sound the alarm about a particular circuit opinion. 15 9 In light of the limitations that any monitoring institution would face, the Supreme Court's choice of selective rather than
systematic monitoring is not itself reason for the lower courts to circumvent
the congressionally designed appellate structure.
In sum, the "congressional incentive" version of the separation-of-powers rationale does not justify statutory stare decisis in the courts of appeals.
For one thing, Congress has significantly less incentive to respond to a decision from a court of appeals than it does to a decision from the Supreme
Court. For another, the way Congress has designed the appellate structure
suggests that it expects the Supreme Court to function as the body primarily
responsible for monitoring and responding to the inferior federal courts. The
congressional incentive theory may well justify statutory stare decisis in the
Supreme Court. But it does not provide a foundation for the doctrine in the
lower courts.
C.

Statutory Stare Decisis as JudicialRestraint

Considering how separation-of-powers principles might justify statutory
stare decisis in the courts of appeals prompts reflection on another way of
understanding the separation-of-powers rationale. Currently, the best articulated justification of statutory stare decisis in case law or commentary is Professor Marshall's. 16° Perhaps, though, it is possible to articulate a new
156 "Percolation" describes the Supreme Court's practice of waiting for several federal and
state courts to address an issue before granting certiorari and deciding an issue itself. See Dorf,
supra note 154, at 65-66.
157 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (arguing that it is not realistic to expect
Congress to monitor the thousands of statutory interpretations that the courts of appeals issue
annually, as opposed to the relatively small number of statutory interpretations that the Supreme Court issues each term).
158 Lindquist & Yalof, supra note 77, at 66-69.
159 See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
160 See generally Marshall, supra note 19.
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justification that does not focus on creating congressional incentives to act.
Another separation-of-powers theme runs implicitly through the statutory
stare decisis decisions of both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
but has not been drawn out by the literature. One could state the principle
this way: courts ought generally to refuse to revisit statutory precedents regardless of whether their refusal prompts congressional action. This rationale

blends aspects of Justice Black's theory with aspects of Professor Marshall's.
Like Justice Black's theory, this rationale focuses on limiting judicial behavior rather than on influencing congressional behavior. 161 Like Professor Marshall's, this rationale is grounded in constitutional policy rather than
2
constitutional proscription.

16

This explanation fits better both with what the circuits and the Supreme
Court actually say about statutory stare decisis. The courts of appeals never
show any concern, and the Supreme Court only rarely shows any concern,
about the likelihood that Congress actually will override statutory interpretations with which it disagrees. 163 The courts most often assert simply that if a
prior judicial interpretation does not capture the statute's meaning, Congress
can-and therefore should-be the one to fix it. 164 The theme running
through their opinions is that a preference for legislative modification of statSee supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
163 Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996), is one of the rare cases in which the
Supreme Court shows concern about affecting congressional behavior.
164 See United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 1998) (Widener, J., dissenting)
(insisting that "change of an authoritative construction of a statute by a court should almost
always be accomplished by Congress rather than by a court"); In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447,
1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (explaining that the court is particularly reluctant to overrule
a statutory interpretation because.in this circumstance, "Congress remains free to alter what we
have done" (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989))), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999); Bath Iron Works Corp. v.
Dir., Office of Worker's Comp. Programs, 136 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 1998) (claiming that "a settled
construction of an important federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so
decides" (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)));
Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the court is
particularly reluctant to overrule a statutory interpretation because in this circumstance, "Congress remains free to alter what we have done" (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989))); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d
871, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same); id. at 881 (Randolph, J., concurring) (claiming that "[it is just
the possibility of a congressional override that the Supreme Court has deemed important" for
purposes of the statutory presumption); United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1177 (9th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that "considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free
to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation" (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 736 (1977))); Fast v. City of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1984) (cautioning that the
power to overrule should be sparingly exercised in a matter of "statutory construction, the kind
of question on which Congress can easily correct us if it wishes"); Miller v. Comm'r, 733 F.2d
399, 409 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Contie, J., dissenting) (asserting that Congress should amend
a statute "if Congress dislikes the construction which the courts ... have traditionally placed
upon it"); Owen v. Comm'r, No. 78-1341, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12069, at *25 (6th Cir. June 23,
1981) (similar); id. at *27 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (claiming that if precedent "is to be changed
that change should be made by the Congress"); Cottrell v. Comm'r, 628 F.2d 1127, 1131 (6th Cir.
1980) (similar); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 565 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1977)
(similar).
161

162
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utory interpretations counsels65 against judicial modification, whether or not
1
Congress is likely to step in.
The preference for legislative modification of statutory interpretations
reflects a basic discomfort with the role of the federal courts in interpreting
statutes. This third version of the separation-of-powers rationale, like the
well-known versions advanced by Justice Black and Professor Marshall, rests
on discomfort with Congress's delegating policymaking authority to the
courts in the form of statutory ambiguity. 166 This assumption stands in sharp
contrast to the way the courts treat similar delegations to administrative
agencies. 167 The Chevron doctrine interprets statutory ambiguity as an implicit delegation of policymaking authority from Congress to administrative
agencies. 68 The ambiguity is the agency's to fill, and, so long as they give an
adequate explanation for a policy shift, agencies are free to shift from one
reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguity to another. 69 Statutory
stare decisis, however, views similar statutory ambiguity in statutes entrusted
primarily to judicial interpretation as cause for concern. 170 While courts cannot wholly avoid the resolution of statutory ambiguity, neither should they
feel free to shift among reasonable interpretations of that ambiguity as they
might if they viewed the gap as truly theirs to fill.

Resolving the question of whether Chevron-style delegations to the judiciary are constitutionally suspect would take a full-length article in itself. For
165 This understanding of the separation-of-powers rationale is particularly clear in Judge
Randolph's dissent in Critical Mass Energy Projectv. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where he
asserts that "[i]t is just the possibility of a congressional override," rather than the likelihood of
one, that is important for purposes of statutory stare decisis. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 881
(Randolph, J., dissenting); cf.John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267,
1316 (1996) (stating that "[t]he mere possibility of [a procedure by which Congress can correct
mistakes], whether or not Congress chooses to employ it, points toward a reduced judicial and
administrative role in correcting statutory mistakes").
166 See Marshall, supra note 19, at 223-25 (arguing that congressional delegations to the
judiciary are constitutionally suspect).
167 It also stands in contrast to the way that the Court treats delegations to the judiciary in
other contexts. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-81, 386-87, 390 (1989) (approving delegation to the judicial branch of authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines); Sibbach
v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (approving delegation to the Supreme Court of authority to
promulgate procedural rules).
168 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
169 See id. at 865-66.
170 See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (noting that an agency
"[e]ntrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments," may abandon old interpretations in
favor of new ones, but the Court "dofes] not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations of a statute"). In this respect, the statutory stare decisis doctrine is internally inconsistent.
While it treats Chevron-like delegations with suspicion, it views more blatant delegations like the
Sherman Act as unproblematic; indeed, the Supreme Court relaxes the stare decisis presumption
in the latter context on the theory that the judiciary is freer to shift among interpretations in the
case of a "common-law statute." See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (asserting that statutory stare decisis is relaxed in the context of the Sherman Act because of that
statute's broad delegation of policymaking authority to the courts). Professor Lawrence Marshall avoids this inconsistency by arguing that his rule of absolute statutory stare decisis ought
also to apply to federal common law decisions and interpretations of common-law-like statutes,
for it is in these instances when "the lawmaking role of the court is at its pinnacle." Marshall,
supra note 19, at 223.

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 73:317

now, it is enough to say that even assuming that such delegations are suspect-an assumption that is open to question-it is doubtful that any individual circuit ought to adopt the super-strong statutory presumption to address
that concern.
It is again a matter of the structural position of the thirteen circuits
within the judicial hierarchy. Compared to the Supreme Court, an individual
circuit has a very limited ability to confine the boundaries of a policymaking
delegation by observing statutory stare decisis. When the Supreme Court
fills a statutory gap, it speaks on behalf of the entire judicial department by
virtue of the obligation that inferior federal courts have to follow Supreme
Court precedent. The Supreme Court's doctrine of statutory stare decisis
presumptively ends the exercise of delegated authority because unless the
Court itself revisits the interpretation, that interpretation stands as the judiciary's final word. No single circuit, however, speaks on behalf of the entire
judicial department. When a single circuit fills a statutory gap, it is still possible that other circuits or the Supreme Court could interpret the statute differently; the delegation is still in play. Thus, a single circuit's observation of
statutory stare decisis does not put a department-wide halt to the exercise of
that delegated authority; it presumptively ends it in only one limited part of
the federal judiciary. Because judicial modification of the statutory interpretation is still possible from other corners of the department, holding out for
legislative modification seems like a hopeless gesture. In this context, court
of appeals decisions are more like the decisions of district courts than the
Supreme Court.
One might respond that perhaps even a very limited restraint is better
than no restraint at all. An individual circuit's observance of statutory stare
decisis will reduce judicial policymaking by concluding the delegation at least
within that circuit, and even a limited reduction of judicial policymaking
might be a benefit worth achieving.
Yet achieving that benefit is in tension with the role that the courts of
appeals otherwise play in the federal court system. By virtue of both their
internal structure and position in the judicial hierarchy, the courts of appeals
should be more open than the Supreme Court to departing from precedent.
For example, the purpose of an en banc sitting is to provide a full-court check
on a three-judge decision. 171 Attributing nearly conclusive weight to the
panel's decision-which is what circuit judges who support statutory stare
decisis find themselves advocating-undermines the very purpose of the en
banc mechanism. In addition, a circuit should be willing to reconsider precedent, including statutory interpretations, based on what its sister circuits do.
Although a circuit is not obligated to follow its peers, decisions from coequal
courts provide the opportunity both to check reasoning and to advance uniformity. Statutory stare decisis focuses a court on its relationship with Congress to the exclusion of its intra- and intercircuit relationships. The Supreme
Court, which does not sit in panels and has no coequal courts, need not take
172
such factors into account.
171
172

See generally FED. R. App. P. 35.
See Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction:The Forward-LookingAspects of Inferior
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Even if statutory stare decisis does not primarily aim to influence congressional behavior, the relationship between Congress and the acting court
is relevant. A preference for legislative modification rather than judicial
modification of a statutory interpretation sets up a dichotomy between the
relevant court and Congress: either the court can change a statutory interpretation, or Congress can, and it is better for Congress to perform that job. For
a court of appeals, however, this is a false dichotomy: change can also come
from the Supreme Court. As already discussed, Congress's allocation of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court can reasonably be interpreted to
reflect a congressional preference that the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, assume primary responsibility for supervising lower court statutory interpretations. 173 And Congress's relatively low rate of response to the courts
of appeals, as opposed to the Supreme Court, may well reflect a reality that
to the extent that Congress engages in an inter-branch dialogue with the
174
courts, it is only interested in (or able to) deal with the Supreme Court.
Thus, when a court of appeals refuses to change a prior statutory interpretation, it can be viewed as restraining its policymaking role in favor of the Supreme Court doing the job rather than in favor of Congress doing the job.
There is no particular separation-of-powers benefit in having one federal
court, rather than another, perform a policymaking function. And given the
Supreme Court's choice of selective rather than systematic lower court monitoring, 175 it makes little sense as a matter of intra-branch practice for a circuit
to adopt a blanket preference for Supreme Court error correction. To the
contrary, having the courts of appeals more freely correct errors in statutory
interpretation would encourage efficiency and uniformity within the judicial
branch. If a court of appeals concludes that it is on the wrong side of a circuit
split, it is more efficient for the court of appeals to rectify the statutory interpretation itself than to force the Supreme Court (and litigants) to expend
resources to resolve the split.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has long given its statutory precedent super-strong
effect, and the courts of appeals have followed suit. As the courts of appeals
apply it, statutory stare decisis is probably best justified neither as a nod to
congressional acquiescence, nor as an attempt to spur congressional action,
but as a simple restraint on judicial policymaking. Even on this different
rationale, however, the doctrine is an ill fit in the inferior courts. Refusing to
revisit statutory interpretations as a means of restraining judicial policymaking may or may not be appropriate in the Supreme Court, which settles the
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). Caminker describes conventional wisdom as
holding that the "judicial function is identical for courts of all levels and that lower courts therefore should expound the law in the same way that the Supreme Court does." Id. But, as
Caminker observes, "this latter assumption fails to consider the possibility that different courts
ought to play different roles in order to best promote the values served by a hierarchical judiciary." Id.
173 See supra p. 346.
174 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
175 See supra pp. 346-47.
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meaning of statutes on behalf of the entire judicial department. But it certainly does not make sense in the courts of appeals, which, by virtue of their
position in the judicial hierarchy, have different considerations to take into
account when deciding whether to overrule precedent.
That is not to say, of course, that the courts of appeals should attribute
no stare decisis effect to their statutory interpretations. Most of the time,
simple reliance interests counsel against a circuit's departure from a prior,
reasonable statutory interpretation. Courts account for reliance interests,
though, with the doctrine of stare decisis as practiced through the centuries.
It is hard to see why the precedential effect of statutory interpretations in the
courts of appeals should be anything more than the simple presumption
against overruling that all opinions enjoy.
This conclusion challenges the conventional approach to interpretive
theory. We tend to take a one-size-fits-all approach to federal court decisionmaking, assuming that the same interpretive practices should apply throughout the federal courts. The example of statutory stare decisis shows,
however, that at least with respect to some interpretive practices, a more
customized approach is in order. As we assess interpretive doctrines, we
ought to pay attention to the relative institutional positions of the courts applying them. Practices that make sense for the Supreme Court do not necessarily make sense for courts at other levels of the federal judiciary.

